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Abstract: 
The economic thresholds for agroforestry investment options were examined for 
six farm sites in New Zealand. A combination of sheep and beef farming and the 
afforestation of pastoral land with Pinus radiata was the specific silvopastoral system 
analyzed. Four alternative investment structures with both a landowner and an 
independent or outside investor were studied. The study looked at an owner-funded farm 
forestry venture; a partnership where the partners employ a property manager; a 100% 
investor owned property; and three joint ventures. Under the forestry Rights Registration 
Act (1983), Joint Ventures are possible through the creation of a "profit a prendre." The 
Agroforestry Estate Model and STANDPAK decision support models were used to 
construct the cost and stand yield tables required for the analysis. Net present value and 
internal rate of return were used for the economic analysis. The projects were examined 
over a range of discount rates from 6-10%. The results of this research provide a tool for 
landowners and investors considering investing in Pinus radiata independently or as a 
partner in a Joint Venture in New Zealand. 
Key Words: Pinus radiata. New Zealand, joint venture, forestry rights 
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Introduction 
The demand for wood products has led to the degradation of much of the planet's 
native forests. As a result, there has been a global movement towards sustainable forest 
practices and establishment of many hectares of intensive plantations of exotic species. 
Given limited global wood supplies, many landowners and investors have become 
interested in alleviating the pressure on the world's native forests. Hoping to enhance and 
promote planted forests as sustainable and environmentally sound, many businesses have 
been working with private landowners. Their goals have been to maximize both parties' 
investment returns while simviltaneously in^roving the environment by planting 
establishing forest plantations. The projects utilize a combination of land uses known as 
agroforestry. For the purpose of this study, agroforestry is defined as the management of 
trees in combination with agricultural systems (Maclaren, 1993). The primary objectives 
of agroforestry are multiple uses, products, and both economic and environmental 
benefits. This study specifically examines silvopastoral systems. The ratio of trees to 
pasture, as well as the intensity grazing and management can vary over the landscape. The 
interest in sustainable plantation investments with farmers seems to be an eflFort by the 
business community to move towards sustainable forms of development. 
The New Zealand pastoral landscape is well suited for plantation forestry and to 
supply a substantial portion of the world's timber. A 1991 Report of the Forestry Joint 
Venture Working Group noted that while it is recognized that the availability of land in 
New Zealand suitable for the establishment of new large-scale commercial plantations is 
limited, there is a vast resource of under-utilized private land suitable for forestry 
(Ministry of Forestry, 1991). While New Zealand has a long history of successful 
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commercial radiata pine plantations, small-scale agroforestry plantations are being planting 
by a sector of New Zealand's sheep and beef fermers. 
According to the 1997 New Zealand Forest Owners Association, New Zealand's 
27 million hectare landscape is divided as follows: 51% or 13.0 million hectares is pasture 
and arable land and six percent or 1.5 million hectares is planted production forest. As of 
June 1997, the area of exotic forest in ownership outside of the 17 major commercial 
forest owners was 401,000 hectares or 1.5% of the total national resource. With a 
program of accelerated afforestation on environmentally marginal private lands, a target of 
4.2 million hectares in plantation forest could be achieved by the year 2020. At this target, 
plantation forestry would stUl only account for 16% of New Zealand's land area whereas 
farmland would still account for over 42%" (MoF, 1991). While there is a surplus of land 
available for afforestation, there are also overseas investors interested in capitalizing on 
the richness of New Zealand's plantable land resource. 
This study examines the variables and parameters that drive New Zealand Pinus 
radiata forestry investments and pastoral land conversion. It attempts to identify the 
threshold points where the resources of the landowner and the cash capital resources of 
the investor will be maximized. Four alternative investment structures with both a 
landowner and an independent or outside investor that illustrate a variety of land sizes, 
scales of project and investment design are studied: 1) An owner-funded farm forestry 
venture; 2) A partnership where the partners emjjtoy a property manager to buy, plant and 
manage a property that was previously pasture land; 3) A 100% investor owned property 
designed to maximize multiple uses and utilize the land in a way that is suited for it's 
different physical attributes, productive capacities and resources for the land; 4) and joint 
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ventures where an agreement between a landowner(s) and investor(s) imder the Forestry 
Rights Registration Act 1983, whereby projSt from tree growing is apportioned to each 
according to their input. 
Background 
While it is clear there are available agricultural lands for conversion and land 
owners interested in planting trees, understanding the reasons why farmers plant trees is an 
essential component of the investment decision. The impetus for a farmer's tree planting 
is inextricably linked to the joint-venture opportunities available to overseas investors. It 
appears that the incentive for converting land from pasture to woodlots is primarily 
economic. However, some studies have suggested otherwise. 
In 1986 Morey published the results of a study on farm forestry with a total sample 
that represented about 8% of the estimated 45,000 fiill-time farmers in New Zealand. 
Morey concluded that while there are many farm foresters who recognize the economic 
returns from trees as well as amenity and aesthetic values, the uses for forest trees on 
farms rated most highly by respondents were: in descending order of importance: shelter 
for stock, shelter for house, landscape-aesthetics, best land use for steep and or low 
productive land, and erosion control, wood for own use, increase farm value and profit 
from sale (Morey, 1986). In addition, the most important reasons for not planting were 
displaces agriculture, lack finance, inadequate returns, and returns too far in the fiiture. 
Not surprisingly, economic motivations ranked as high amongst reasons for not planting as 
they ranked low amongst uses for forest trees on the farm (Morey, 1986). 
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Enevoldsen (1990) suggested the reason for the lower rankings of economic 
concerns in Morey's (1986) work is that farmers simply are unaware of the economic 
factors affecting profitability and value of a farm plantation. This suggests that farmers 
could be motivated to plant trees simply by informing them about its profitability. 
Enevoldsen concluded that ki some regions farmers planted trees mainly for erosion 
control and landscape reasons, while elsewhere farmers planted to provide shelter and 
shade for livestock and their homes. Motives related to profit were ranked lowest for 
both groups. About 50% of the formers regarded farm cash flow as a constraint for 
managmg trees, whereas about 40% were constrained by lack of on farm labor ... Of all 
farmers with more than 7 ha in trees, 86% financed their plantations fi-om farm cash flow. 
Borrowing and joint ventures had a remarkable low importance (2% and 6%) 
(Enevoldson, 1990). Moreover, it is clear that a farmer's knowledge of parameters 
affecting the profitability of plantations is very poor. None of the landowners knew what 
it costs to establish radiata pine, only 4% were aware of thinning costs and only 18% 
knew the value of a pruned stand at harvest (Enevoldson, 1990). Therefore, it appears 
that education about the economic variables involved in planting and harvesting trees 
might lead more farmers to convert a portion of their land to woodlots and increase the 
investment opportunities for outside investors. 
Most recently, Fairweather and SwafiBeld (1995) investigated the preferences of 
stakeholders... for different land-use options involving forestry. Individuals expressed 
preferences illustrating environmental effects for a range of technically feasible range of 
land-use options, including forestry, agriculture, and conservation. Respondents who saw 
trees as improving the land saw the role of large plantations for production on the hills and 
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lower slopes and for soil conservation on the higher rainfall flats. Moreover, respondents 
preferring tree planting as a replacement for and or in combination with improved pasture 
placed the greatest emphasis upon productive enhancement of the land resource. Visual 
effects of land use were considered significant and when forestry was the preferred 
primary land use, there was a preference for "naturalistic" shaped plantations. When the 
respondents preferred multiple use forestry and grazing, there was a strong preference for 
clearly defined land uses characterized by clear boimdaries. When conservation was the 
primary land use objective, the "image of clean, open tussock grazing land was critical, 
although it is important to note that small, clearly defined plantations were also acceptable 
on hills and slopes" (Fairweather and Swaffield, 1995). 
If the incentive to plant trees is not economic, what role do economics play in an 
incentive for farmers to convert their land? What factors would encourage farmers to 
convert their land and be receptive to alternative land use plans? More importantly, to 
ensure a successfiil niche for small afforestation ventures, how can willing overseas 
investors market their idea to a community that doesn't seem to react strongly to the 
economic rewards that come fi-om retiring their paddocks fi-om grazing and planting 
woodlots? A time series study of four previous surveys of New Zealand farmers and 
farm woodlot owners which have been conducted since 1982, shows that [in November 
1994] the replacement of a forestiy encouragement grant by tax deductibility of forestry 
expenditures changed the financial and profit motivations for planting. Many farmers 
with zero or marginal tax rates were severely disadvantaged by the changes, having little 
or nothing to which they could apply deductions. Consequently, "this sxirvey found that 
lack of finance is a constraint to tree planting second only to displacement of agriculture 
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amongst farmers generally, and is the leading reason for not establishing greater areas 
amongst planters and intending planters (Morey, 1986). 
It is clear that in the absence of subsidies and government incentives, it is the 
responsibility of those who see potential long-term benefits in agroforestry to seek new 
solutions to finance their projects. Joint ventures are coordinated options that can relieve 
the landowner of the financial burden of forestry investment, but Morey's (1986) study 
found that they were considered much less effective in achieving the best price for the 
grower by respondents. One explanation for this assessment of joint ventures could be that 
fanners, even agroforesters, do not expect that the economic returns fi-om farm forestry 
will be high enough to attract urban based investment capital (Morey, 1986). A second 
explanation for reservations about joint ventures is the issue of profit sharing and fixture 
market control (Morey, 1986). Finally, the lack of enthusiasm for joint ventures might also 
be a manifestation of agriculture versus forestry land use conflicts (Morey, 1986). 
Recognizing that agroforestry projects are an intricate web of economic, social and 
political incentives and prejudices, an increase in the nimiber of publications, organizations 
and investors interested in planting trees suggests that there is a niche for further 
exploration into the benefits of planting trees on pastoral landscapes. 
Area of Study 
Assuming farmers are willing to plant trees, this study identifies three regions of 
New Zealand's North Island that were suitable for maximizing forestry enterprises. They 
are the Coastal Bay of Plenty, Wairarapa and Taranaki. The criteria for selection were site 
index, proximity to a port and sawmills, and significant land available for conversion. 
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The Coastal Bay of Plenty has been identified by the Ministry of Forestry as the 
'The Central North Island wood supply region.' The dominant land use in this region is 
pastoral farming. The sheep and beef farming indmtry in the Bay of Plenty has been 
shrinking rapidly and current statistics suggest there are less than 300 sheep and beef 
farms in the region larger than 50ha (MAF, 1997). The rapid decline is attributed to 
forestry, dairy conversion and subdivisions into lifestyle units (farming is not the primary 
income) (MAF, 1997). Smaller forests and woodlots are found throughout the region, but 
are more common in the central and eastern areas. 
The site quality or suitability is defined by the site and basal area (Eyles, 1986). 
The radiata pine site index of the Coastal Bay of Plenty exceeds 29m. Site indices 
greater than 25m (20 year base) occur on 77% of North Island. (Eyles, 1986) Radiata 
pine accounts for 90% of the planted timber resource with 5% in Douglas fir. The Bay of 
Plenty plantation forests represent 40% of New Zealand's exotic forests (MoF, 1993). 
The Bay of Plenty region includes the Port of Tauranga which serves the entire 
Central North Island region and is the principal port handling almost 70 % of the nations 
forestry exports. The region's processing plants include two large kraft pulp and paper 
mills, one large and one small chemical thermo-mechanical pulp mill, 35 sawmills, two 
veneer plants, four post and pole manufacturers and one combined particle board and 
medium density fibreboard plant (MoF, 1993). The Coastal Bay of Plenty has an 
extensive network of national and provincial highways and urban and rural roads. 
There is national transport network of railfi-eight servicing the forestry sector (MoF, 
1993). 
The Wairarapa region is on the southern coast of the North Island. There are 
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approximately 680 farms in the Wairarapa region (MAF, 1997). The region is prone to 
dry summer periods with relatively low annual rainfall (MAF, 1997). On the coast, 
Wairarapa soils generally have low fertility, but respond well to fertilizers yielding 
productive pastoral land use. The hilly lands are prone to erosion and severe gully 
erosion has been controlled by planting trees (MoF, 1993). The site index of the 
Wairarapa ranges between 25 and 29m (20 yr base). Radiata pine dominates new 
plantings. 
Pulp, post and pole production and sawmilling are the primary wood processing 
industries on the southern North Island. Although there are no export fecilities in the 
region, a chip miU at Masterson supplies chips from low-grade logs for the Pan Pacific 
pulp mill near Napier. Transportation systems are limited. Projections for the year 2000 
suggest that forest products will represent 25% to 30% of the port of Wellington's total 
exports (MoF, 1993). 
There are approximately 460 owner/operator sheep and beef properties in the 
Taranaki district. (MAF, 1997). The region is characterized by a summer-wet climate 
and a mix of rolling to steep hills with some good flats. Soils are productive and variable. 
Radiata pine site index exceeds 29m on the southwest coast and ranges between 25 and 
29m (20 yr base) on the remainder of the landscape (Eyles, 1986). 
A good network of roads connects the Taranaki Region. However, the Pararapa 
road limits the carrying capacity of the region. The Westgate Taranaki Port of New 
Plymouth is on the West Coast of the North Island and in the Taranaki Region. The total 
cubic metre of logs exported each year continues to rise while the export of other forest 
products are negligible (MoF, 1993). 
Farm Types 
Four alternative investment structures for landowners and outside investors are 
illustrated through the following studies. Farm A is a 245 ha farm in the eastern Bay of 
Plenty. The owners have independently fvmded the 53 ha of radiata pine plantations they 
have established and managed on their farm for 27 years. Farm B is a 152 ha farm in the 
eastern Bay of Plenty. Twenty-five partners employ a property manager to buy, plant and 
manage the property as an investment. They have planted 112 ha and leased the remaining 
40 ha out for grazing rights and separately as a homestead. Farm C is a 5891 ha hill 
country sheep and beef station entirely investor owned evaluated as an integrated forestry, 
livestock, and tourism venture. The investors and owners have proposed to plant 2200 
hectares with radiata pine, 1473 ha of native bush preserved for its environmental, 
commercial and recreational potential, and the remaining 2218 ha leased to a farmer for 
grazing and homesteading. Farm D, Farm E and Farm F are all owned by farmers who 
have opted to seek outside investors and form a Joint Venture under the Forestry Rights 
Registration Act. Although each Joint Venture is tailored to suit the needs of both parties, 
the landowner contributions are usually the use of the land, and the fixed costs of the farm. 
The investor's contribution is finance for forest development and management, labor and 
equipment required for planting, managing and harvesting. 
Silvicultural Model 
Yield tables were modeled using version 6.0 of STANDPAK a decision support 
system for radiata pine and Douglas-fir (Pseudotsuga menziesii) in New Zealand. (FRI, 
1995). STANDPAK predicts the volume and grades for logs or saw timber, and can be 
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used to evaluate land use options at a stand level (Whiteside, 1989). STANDPAK allows 
the user to schedule silviculture and generate single hectare yield tables based on the site 
index, silviculture and market inputs. The single hectare yield tables from STANDPAK 
were used to assess the agroforestry projects at an estate level. The agroforestry projects 
were modeled using version 3.0 of the Agroforestry Estate Model (AEM) (Knowles and 
Middlemiss, 1991), a decision support system designed to show the effects of a sustained 
planting and felling program on a farm's financial flows. Agroforestry is evaluated by the 
model at both the project and whole farm level (Knowles and Middlemiss, 1991). AEM 
allows the evaluation of a wide range of scenarios and options and traces the physical and 
financial flows through time. AEM was run for each site to analyze the cumulative affects 
of multiple plantings was created for each site and then a separate run was created to 
evaluate each joint venture as independent project separate from the whole farm. For the 
purpose of the comparative evaluations, input assumptions were made for both 
STANDPAK and AEM. The management and financial assumptions that remain constant 
for all farms will be described here and the farm specific assumptions will be outlined on a 
farm by farm basis. 
Input Assumptions 
To generate yield tables, STANDPAK requires estimates of stand parameters and 
starting values (Maclaren, 1993). While some of these were predicted by the model, the 
mean topheight, basal area and mean diameter at breast height were specific inputs derived 
from regional plot data or from the farm itself While STANDPAK required a 
quantitative basal area input, the early growth model requires the user to define the basal 
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area as low, medium, or high. High basal areas are usually found on land with over 
1000mm of annual rainfall and where the growth of nitrogen fixing clovers has been 
encouraged by phosphate and intensive grazing. Medium basal area is associated with 
land were sufficient fertilizer has been applied to counteract the soil nutrient deficiencies 
(West at al, 1987). The site index for each site was derived fi*om Eyles (1986). For ease 
of analysis, a single site index was chosen for each plantation site. However, there are 
variations of site index over farms as well as within paddocks. Depending on the 
microclimactic conditions, bottom slope site indices can vary by more than 6 m compared 
with hilltops (Jarvis et al., 1989). The implications of this variation will be discussed later. 
A target DOS (diameter over stubs) of 17.0 cm was set in STANDPAK and the model 
automatically designed a silvicultural regime based on this target. Rotations were limited 
to 28 years which is within typical ranges for radiata pine recommended by Maclaren 
(1993). 
AEM requires a set of inputs specific to the site being evaluated. To build a 
project in AEM, the user must enter the farm accounts, define the crop type, define the 
planting and felling program, and apply the crop type to the planting areas. To build a 
crop type, the user creates a labor table, a costs table, an imderstory table, and a yield 
table. The STANDPAK yield tables were in^orted directly into the AEM software. The 
labor table for the silvicultural operation costs were calculated using the New Zealand 
Forest Service estimates. This data was applied to the labor rates and used to generate a 
labor table. Unless stated otherwise, log prices were derived from the New Zealand Farm 
Forestry Association (1997). Supervision costs of 15% were assimied. The costs table 
included the costs of plantation establishment and management not included in the labor 
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table. The farm account numbers were taken from the model sheep and beef ferms, as 
described in the MAP Farm Monitoring Reports. The statistics have been modified to 
accurately represent the size and livestock unit (Isu) carrying capacity of each farm site. 
An assumption of this analysis was that the financial returns per hectare of land were 
optimized with a management regime which produced high value clearwood logs while 
maintaining grazing where it was deemed appropriate. The division of the project costs 
and revenues between the landowner and investor are summarized on a farm by farm 
basis. 
Investment Model 
Internal Rates of Return (IRR) and Net Present Values (NPV) were used for the 
economic analysis. One of the most controversial analysis inputs is the choice of an 
appropriate discount rate. Usually a discount rate is chosen to reflect the forgone rates of 
return on the marginal project displaced by the investment option or the opportimity cost 
of the capital being used over time. Because the choice of an appropriate discount rate 
can be controversial and depends largely on the subtleties of the circumstances, this study 
recognizes the limitations to selecting a discount rate that accurately reflects all of the 
market variables and individual preferences and choices. 
For example, the New Zealand treasury insists on a 10% discount rate for projects 
receiving government support (Jarvis and Perley, 1989). Major forest companies regard 
7% as an acceptable rate for forestry investments (Jarvis and Perley, 1989). In the United 
States, the USDA Forest Service uses a discount rate of 4% for evaluating long-term 
investments in resource management (Jarvis and Perley, 1989). Subsequently, for the 
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purpose of financial analysis, this study will look at the outcome over a range of discount 
rates between 6 and 10 percent. 
Farm Sites Methods and Assumptions 
This study examines two farm sites in the Coastal Bay of Plenty. Both of these 
illustrate two different forestry investment vehicles. The first farm forestry venture, Farm 
A is a sheep and beef farm funded by the owners. Farm A is 56 km fi-om the port in 
Tauranga. The livestock carrying capacity averages 2900 livestock units. The property is 
comprised of 60% short steep hiUs and 40% broad valley bottoms or ridge crests. It has 
several pockets of native bush and a stream running through the native forest and the 
pasture. The predominant species in the valley bottoms are ryegrass and white clover 
while the hill species are rice grass (Microlaena stipoides), summer grass {Digitaria 
sanguinalis) and brown top (Agrostis tenuis). When Farm A was first established, the 
Paengaroa hills and the light pumice soil derived fi-om Kaharoa and Taupo ash were prone 
to erosion if disturbed. Concern for their land and the poorly eroded soils led the 
owners to apply agroforestry principles on their farm After observing the excellent tree 
growth rates in their first paddock, they decided to expand their tree planting goals fi-om 
erosion control to income diversity. 
Planting started in 1970 and has averaged 2.6 ha per year (Knowles et al., 1991). 
Their planting program proposes that they plant and fell a cumulative total of 314 ha over 
100 years. The primary species planted is radiata pine, but they have also planted Cypress 
(Cupressus lusitanica), Eucalypts (Eucalyptus saligna), Poplars (E botryoides), and 
Walnuts (Acacia melanoxylon). Because the farm is owner fimded, the labor hours were 
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family members rather than contract. The owner's experience is a benchmark in the 
Coastal Bay of Plenty for owner funded diversification into agroforestry. Using the MAF 
Farm Monitoring Report for the Coastal Bay of Plenty, this study looks at the 
silvicutultural scenarios and evaluates the economic returns to a farmer who independently 
fimds an agroforestry project. 
For the STANDPAK analysis, the required plot data points were generated fi-om 
Forest Research Institute plot data. The STANDPAK model NAPIRAD was used to 
simulate the late growth model. NAPIRAD is based on the growth rates of207 plots east 
of Bay of Plenty. A complete record of the STANDPAK growth model assimiptions and 
the details of NAPIRAD are available in Appendix 1. The AEM input farm costs and 
revenues are based on the MAF Model Farm for the Coastal Bay of Plenty. The total 
farm size is 245 hectares, the project land value is NZ$4500/ha (.6US$ ~1NZ$) and the 
total farm livestock unit (Isu) carrying capacity is 3060. Table 1 outlines the AEM inputs 
for Farm A. 
Table 1. Farm A AEM Input Assumptions. 
Operation 
Farm A: 270/300 sph final crop 
hrs/ha/vr costNZ$/hr NZ$/ha 
Initial stocking plant 400 sph 
Release Spray 400 sph 
3.8 year old prune 250 sph to 2.2 m 
4.0 year old thin to waste 
4.8 year old prune 225 sph to 3.6 m 
5.9 year old prune 225 sph to 5.2 m 
7.2 year old prune 135 sph to 6.3 m 
8.0 year prune remainder to 6.3m 
Various stand ages thin to waste 
9 
11 
12 
3 
2.5 
5 
3.3 
9 
20 
20 
20 
25 
20 
20 
20 
20 
25 
100 
60 
180 
25 
180 
220 
240 
60 
62.5 
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Farm A: 135 sph final crop 
Operation hrs/ha/yr cost NZ$/hr NZ$/ha 
Initial stocking 150 sph 3 20 60 
Release Spray 150 sph 1.65 20 33 
4 year old prune 140 sph to 2.2m 6 20 120 
4 year thin to 142 sph 1 25 25 
5 year old prune 140 to 3.6 m 6 20 120 
6 year old prune 135 sph to 5.2m 8 20 160 
7 year old prune 75 sph to 6.3 7 20 140 
7 year old thin to 135 sph 1 25 25 
8.0 year prune remainder to 6.3 4 20 , 80 
Farm A: Cost Table 135 sph 
Operation year start year finish NZ$/ha 
Establishment 1 1 
Farm A; Cost Table 270 sph 
Oneration year start year finish 
100 
NZ$/ha 
Establishment 1 1 220 
Farm A: Aggregation yield table m^ 270/300 sph 
Log types 
PR grade pruned domestic sawlog; min. small end diameter (s.e.d) 40 cm; length 3 to 6m 
A grade Japan export: min. s.e.d.30 cm, length 12.1m 
S3L3 domestic: min. s.e.d 16-25cm, length 3 to 6m 
K grade Korean export: min. s.e.d.20, length 5.5 to 11.Im 
Pulp domestic chip; length no min. s.e.d, length 3 to 8m 
Age PR A S3L3 K Mp Total 
28 248.30 93.10 98.30 237.70 43.0 720.40 
Farm A: Aggregation yield table m^ 135 sph 
Age PR A, S3L3 K Pulp Total 
28 174.90 11.50 22.70 195.20 81.70 486.0 
Log Prices NZ$(age 28) at the farm gate (stumpage value) per m^ 
Age PR A S3L3 K Pulp 
28 $125 $75 $50 $45 $10 
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Harvesting Costs 
Operation Crop Type NZ$/m^ 
Cartage $0.17 m3/km x 50km 
Administration/Sales 
Wharfage 
Commission 
Total 
$8.50 
$3.50 
$13.00 
$5-$11 
31.00 
Farm B Partnership 
The second Coastal Bay of Plenty property illustrates the partnership model as an 
investment vehicle for agroforestry. Partnership B at Mystery Downs is 50km from the 
Port of Taxiranga. In 1991, the partners purchased a 153.7 ha sheep and beef farm for 
NZ$ 465,000. The laws limited the partners to 25 people and the project was divided 
into 50 shares selling for NZ$ 12,000/share. With the exception of the homestead and 
the grazing lease on 41.7 ha, the purpose was to afforest the pasture with radiata pine in 
three stages from 1992-1994. The initial surplus monies in addition to the annual income 
from the homestead and grazing leases has provided enough money to cover the 
establishment and preliminary management costs. In 1994 the partnership purchased 7 
ha of additional planted trees from the New Zealand government. With the exception of 
three shares, the original partnership has remained intact and the September, 1997 asking 
share rate was NZ$30,000. Excluding the value of the planted trees, the current valuation 
for the block is NZ$ 1,200,000. The Coastal Bay of Plenty has experienced an increase in 
land value due to the demand for lifestyle blocks and the high returns on daily farms. This 
study uses the Farm B partnership as an illustration of an investment vehicle for more than 
one investor interested in purchasing a block of land and planting trees. 
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STANDPAK calculated the projected values based on adjacent Paengaroa research 
plots. The AEM input farm costs and revenues are based on the MAF Model Farm for the 
Coastal Bay of Plenty. 
Table 2. Farm B AEM Input Assumptions. 
For the purpose of the study, the paddock stocking rates (400 and 670 sph) were averaged 
to (535 sph) to create one labor table. 
Operation hrs/ha/yr cost NZ$/hr NZ$/ha 
Initial stocking 535 sph 5 20.00 100.00 
4.8 year old pnme 400 sph to 2.5m 18 16.41 295.38 
Thin to 450 sph 2 10.49 38.98 
6.0 year old pnme 370 sph to 4.5m 17 16.41 278.97 
Thin to 370 sph 4 19.49 77.96 
8.0 year old prune 325 sph to 6.5m 18 16.41 295.38 
Farm B: Aggregation yield table m^ 
Age PR A K S3L3 Pulp Total Waste 
28 248.8 174.5 145.1 59.3 135.7 763.4 10.4 
FarmB: Log Prices NZ$ per m^ 
Age PR A S3L3 K Pulp 
28 $160 $126 $65 $96 $42 
Farm B: Establishment Costs 
Operation year start year finish cost NZ$/ha 
Planting 1 1 $306 
Releasing 1 1 $89.80 
Prep 0 0 $6.46 
Farm B: Harvesting Costs 
Operation Crop Type NZ$/m^ 
Log and Load 18.00 
Cartage 8.50 
Roading (Arterial) .76 
Administration/Sales 5.00 
Total 32.26 
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FarmC 
On the Eastern Wairarapa Coast is Farm C. This is a 100% single investor owned 
property designed to maximize multiple uses and utilize the land in a way that is suited for 
its different physical attributes, productive capacities, and resources for the land. Farm C 
is an illustration of how miiltiple use forestry and private landscape design plays an 
important role in farm land management. 
Farm C is situated 65 km southeast of Masterton. The 1997 valuation was NZ$ 
5,075,000. The majority of the property receives an annual rainfall of approximately 950 
mm per year with a tendency for a dry summer dry. The landscape is diverse with 
potential for maximization of multiple use options. The farm is 25% native bush and 75% 
pasture. The livestock carrying capacity is 30,000 Isu. The proposed land management 
scheme involves planting the 2200 of the 2592 hectares of pasture and light scrub pockets 
with radiata pine. The native bush pockets will remain intact and the planting will be 
achieved paddock by paddock giving each planted area definable boundaries in the form of 
existing fence lines. 
For the STANDPAK analysis, the required plot data points were generated fi*om 
adjacent New Zealand Forest Service Ngaumu Forest plots. The STANDPAK early 
growth model crop type assiraiptions are NAPIRAD. The AEM farm costs were derived 
fi-om the MAF Hawke's Bay - Wairarapa summer dry model farm reports. 
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Table 3: Farm C ASM Input Assumptions. 
FarmC: Operation hrs/ha/vr cost NZ$/hr NZ$/ha 
Initial Stocking 950 sph 15 18 270 
Release 950 sph 3.5 18 63 
6 yr prune 320 sph to 2.2 m 13 20 260 
6 yr thin to 640 sph 6 25 150 
8 yr prune 320 sph to 4.2 m 14 20 280 
10 yr thin to 480 sph 6 25 150 
10 yr prune 320 sph to 6.2m 18 20 360 
Farm C: Aggregation yield table 
Age PR A K S3L3 Pulp TRV 
28 190 59 124 151 131 655 
Farm C: Log Prices NZ$ m^ 
Age PR A S3L3 K Pulp 
28 $190 $119 $71 $95 $49 
3 
Farm C; Harvesting Costs 
Operation Crop Type NZ$/m 
Cartage $0.17 m3/kmx 140km $19.57 
Administration/Sales $5.42 
Log and Load $19.82 
Roading $2.53 
Total $47.34 
Taranaki Joint Ventvires - Methods and Assumptions 
With the implementation of the Resource Management Act in 1991, regional 
environmental jurisdictions have been divided by catchment boundaries. These 
jurisdictions are (run) by regional councils. As a component of their informational 
advocacy campaign, the Taranaki Regional Covmcil examines the land-use capabilities of 
farm properties within the Council boundaries and suggests the best uses for each site on 
the land. While plans are provided for landowners to promote voluntary change towards 
sustainable land use practices, the long term goals are aimed at restoring the regions 
ecosystems. AflForestation with radiata pine is the most widely recommended means for 
restoring the eroded soils on the Taranaki hill country sites. To finance afforestation 
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eflfoits, the council promotes joint ventures as a means to fimd forest establishment, 
management and harvesting costs. 
The purpose of joint ventures is the combining of land, capital and labor to make 
the best use of those resources for the mutual benefit of all participating parties (Ministry 
of Forestry, 1991). Under the Forestry Rights Registration Act 1983, Joint Ventures are 
possible through the creation of a "profit a prendre." A profit a prende is defined as a 
right to enter on the land of another and take therefi-om some part of its substance or 
produce (MoF, 1991). The Act creates a "Forestry Rights" which is the formal 
registration of rights using the Forest Rights Registration Act 1983. It is defined in the act 
as a right granted by the grantor of any land to any other person to a) Establish, maintain 
and harvest; or b) Maintain and harvest, a crop of trees on that land, together with c) Any 
ancillary rights of access and of constructing and using such tracks, culverts, bridges, 
buildings and other works and facilities as may be necessary to establish, maintain, and 
harvest, or as the case may be, to maintain and harvest the crop: and d) Any provisions for 
charges, payments, royalties, or division of the crop or the proceeds of the group, whether 
or not such rights or provisions are coupled with an obligation; but no such right shall be 
capable of conferring a right of exclusive possession of that land. (Forestry Rights 
Registration Act, 1983). 
A forestry right is created by registering a joint venture agreement against the title 
of land with the District Land Register under the Land Transfer Act 1952 (MoF, 1994). 
The report of the Forestry Joint Venture Working Group identified three different types of 
joint venture relationships. First, the bringing together of individual or corporate investors 
for the purpose of an investment in forestry (MoF, 1991). Second, the bringing together 
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of investors and land owners for the purpose of forestry enterprise (MoF, 1991). Third, 
the coming together of forest owners for the purpose of managing the forest for their 
mutual benefit (MoF, 1991). 
Conceptually, in a forestry joint venture, a landowner invites an investor to 
contribute the capital to work on the landowners land and each would derive a share of 
the returns commensurate with the worth of each partner's inputs (MoF, 1991). The 
distribution of revenue from a Forestry Right for grantor and grantee should reflect the 
earnings rate of the project and the relative inputs by landowner and grantee investor. For 
example, high value land which can be planted inejqiensively should earn more for the 
landowner than inexpensive land with high costs of clearing and planting at equal distance 
from the point of sale of forest produce (MoF, 1991). There are a wide range of input and 
revenue distribution arrangements a landowner and investor can take. Consequently, 
while the joint ventvire is uniform is concept, each registered forestry right is a highly 
tailored agreement designed specifically to meet the needs of both parties involved. 
Farm D is an 840 ha sheep and beef farm in Makahu. The owners have two joint 
ventures on their land and have planted a total of 94 out of the 840 hectares in radiata pine 
trees. The farm is 43 km east of Stratford and 86km from New Plymouth. It's on the 
periphery of Taranaki's pastoral land base and is adjacent to an area of indigenous forest 
(the Matemateaonga Range.) The farm is characterized by a small area of flat to rolling 
terrain, but the majority is steep hills. The farm experiences a temperate climate with an 
evenly distributed armual rainfaU of 1900 mm. The farm is 73% pasture, 14% indigenous 
forest or scrub, 11% exotic and 2% residential and farm buildings and unavailable areas. 
The property winters approximately 5000 Isus (70% sheep and 30% cattle). 
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For the STANDPAK analysis, the required plot data points were generated from 
adjacent property Forest Research Institute plot data. STANDPAK calc;ilated the 
projected values based on FRI known starting values. The STANDPAK model 22 
PPM88 was used to simulate the late growth model. The AEM input ferm 
costs and revenues are based on the MAF Model Farm for the Taranaki Region. 
Table 4: Farm D AEM Input Assumptions. 
Operation hrs/ha/vr cost NZ$/hr NZ$/ha 
Initial Stocking 833 sph 11 20 220 
Release 833 sph 8.5 20 170 
4 yr prune 350 sph to 2.2 m 22.5 20 450 
5 yr thin to 500 sph 5.3 25 132.5 
6 yr prune 325 sph to 4.2 m 26 20 520 
7 yr thin to 325 sph 10.6 25 265 
8 yr prune 320 sph to 6.2m 30 20 600 
11 yr. Dothistroma Spray 1.75 20 35 
Farm D: Establishment Costs 
Operation start vr. finish yr. NZ$/ha 
Establishment 1 1 175 
Herbicide 1 1 30 
Repairs and Maintenance 1 28 5 
Weeds/Pest 1 28 2 
Accoimts/audit 1 28 6 
Farm D: Log aggregation yield table: m 
Aee PR A K S3L3 Pulp Total Waste 
28 217.3 90.9 120.3 52.6 126.8 608.1 7.9 
Farm D: Log Prices $NZ m^ 
Age PR A S3L3 K Pulp 
28 $192 $80.62 $57 $67.17 $37 
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Harvesting Costs Operation Crop Type NZ$/m3 
Cartage $0.17 m^/kmx 93kni $15.81 
Administration/Sales $ .20 
Total $16.11 
A joint venture scenario was evaluated for the plantations on Farm E. This 
involved an AEM run for each planting (57ha in 1993) and (37ha in 1994). The division 
of the project costs and grazing revenues between the landowner and the investor are 
summarized in Table 5. 
Table 5. Farm D Joint Venture Revenues and Costs Distributions. 
Revenues Landowner % Investor % 
Understorey revenues before planting 100% 0% 
Understorey revenues after planting 100% 0% 
Costs Landowner% Investor% 
Silviculture costs 0% 100% 
Supervision of silvicultvire 0% 100% 
Incidental costs 0% 100% 
Establishment costs 0% 100% 
Re-establishment 0% 100% 
Fixed costs 100% 0% 
Land cost 100% 0% 
The joint venture was evaluated over a 28-year period. The joint venture cash flows were 
calculated by AEM at discount rates from 6% to 10% at 2% intervals. 
Farm E is 250 ha, 13 km east of Hawera and 73km from New Plymouth. It's on 
the periphery of Taranaki's pastoral land and is adjacent to the Tarere Forest. The farm is 
characterized by a small area of flat to rolling terrain, but the majority is steep hills. The 
lithology is volcanic ash overlaying Tertiary sedimentary silty sandstone and the soils are 
free draining yellow-brown loams (MoF, 1993). The farm experiences a temperate 
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climate with an feirly evenly distributed annual rainfall of about 1800 mm. The farm is 
20% pasture, 13% indigenous forest or scrub, 65% exotic forest and 2% residential and 
farm buildings and unavailable areas. Most of the flats are leased out to a dairy farmer 
down the road and the owner continues to graze sheep in the hilk amidst the forests and a 
few heifers on the flat. The property summers approximately 1030 livestock units (80% 
sheep and 20% cattle). 
For the STANDPAK analysis, the required plot data points were generated from 
New Zealand Forest Research Institute plot data from a property in the region. The 
STANDPAK model PPM88 was used to simulate the late growth model. The AEM input 
farm costs and revenues are based on the MAF Model Farm for the Taranaki Region. 
Farm E has three joint ventures on the land and has planted 163 out of250 ha 
(65%) in radiata pine. Joint Venture 1 was established in 1991 and contains 110 ha or 
44% or his total land. Joint Venture 2 was established in 1994 and contains 25 hectares or 
10% of his total land. Joint Venture 3 was established in 1997 and is also a 25 ha block. 
Because the distribution of final revenues vary depending on the contribution of inputs, 
each of the landowner's joint ventures has been specifically tailored to reflect the costs 
associated with the individual forestry block. Specifically, Joint Venture 1 has a 40% 
landowner, 60% investor split while Joint Venture 2 45% landowner, 55% investor split. 
Joint Venture 3 was still negotiating the terms of the distribution. A forest manager was 
hired to do the plantings and silviculture, but the landowner maintains careful stewardship 
over the trees. Goats, possums and hare pose a threat to young trees and the landowner 
spent five hours a day for three months shooting goats in 1997. 
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Table 6: Farm E AEM Input Assumptions. 
Farm E 920/1000 sph: JV 1 (1997) JV2 (1994) 
Operation hrs/ha/yr costNZ$/ha NZ$/ha 
Initial Stocking 960 sph 11 20 220 
Release 960 sph 8.5 20 170 
2nd Release 960 sph 1.75 20 35 
5 yr prune 320 sph to 2.2 m 22.5 20 450 
6 yr prune 320 sph to 4.2 m 26 20 520 
8 yr thin to 480 sph 10.6 25 265 
8 yr prune 320 sph to 6.2m 30 20 600 
8 yr. Dothistroma Spray 1.75 20 35 
11 yr. Dothistroma Spray 1.75 20 35 
JV 1997 1 Costs Table 
Operation Start (vr) Finish (vr) Cost (NZS/ha/vr) 
Establishment 1 1 190 
Fire protection 1 28 2 
Rates 1 28 13.5 
Repairs and Maint. 1 28 5 
Weed/pest control 1 28 2 
Accounts/audit 1 28 6 
JV 1994 Costs Table 
Operation Start (vr) Finish (yr') Cost (NZ$/ha/vr) 
Establishment 1 1 190 
Rates 1 28 20.7 
Fire protection 1 28 2 
Repairs and Maintenance 1 28 5 
Weed/pest control 1 28 2 
Accounts/audit 1 28 6 
FarmE; JV 3 1991 600 sph 
Operation hrs/ha/vr NZ$/hr NZ$/ha 
Initial Stocking 600 sph 9.3 20 186 
Release 600 sph 13.9 20 278 
4 yr prune xx sph to 2.2 m 11.3 20 226 
7 yr prune xx sph to 4.2 m 11.3 20 226 
10 yr thin to 320 sph 5.5 25 137.5 
10 yr prune 320 sph to 6.2m 12.5 20 250 
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FarmE: JV 1991 Costs Table 
Operation Start fvr') Finish fvr> Cost rNZ$/ha/vr') 
Establishment 1 1 190 
Fire Insurance 8 28 286 
Management 1 28 269 
Roading 27 28 182 
Administration 1 28 127 
Setup and legal 1 28 9 
Fanii E; Log Aggregation Yield Table 
Age PR A K S3L3 Pulp TRY Waste 
28 212.8 148 104.8 62.4 110.8 638.9 8.6 
Farm E: Log Prices $NZ m 
Age PR A S3L3 K Pulp 
28 $188 $119 $71 $95 $49 
Farm E: Harvesting Costs Crop Type NZ$/m^ 
Cartage $0.17 m3/km x 73km $12.41 
Administration/Sales $5.00 
Log and Load $13.00 
Roading (covered in costs table) $0.76 
Total $31.17 
A joint venture scenario was evaluated for the plantations on Farm E. This 
involved an AEM run for each planting (JV 1 1 lOha in 1991) and (JV NPDC2 25ha in 
1994) and (NPDCl 25ha in 1997). The division of the project costs and grazing revenues 
between the landowner and the investor are summarized in Table 7. 
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Table 7. Farm E Joint Venture Revenues and Costs Distributions. 
Revenues Landowner Investor 
Understory revenues before planting 100% 0% 
Understory revenues after planting 100% 0% 
Costs 
Silviculture costs 0% 100% 
Supervision of silviculture 0% 100% 
Incidental costs 0% 100% 
Materials costs 0% 100% 
Establishment Costs 0% 100% 
Fixed costs 100% 0% 
Land cost 100% 0% 
Farm F is 105.8 km from New Plymouth. The total property area is 242.8 ha with 
a proposed 186.7 hectare joint venture. It's in the heart of Taranaki's pastoral hill country 
land. The farm is characterized by a small area of valley flats rising into moderately steep 
to steep country with areas of bare rock and ejqjosed bluffs. The farm experiences a 
ten^erate climate with an fairly evenly distributed annual rainfall of about 1800 mm to 
2000mm. The farm is 6% pasture, 20% indigenous forest, 73% exotic forest, and less 
than 1% residential and farm buildings and unavailable areas. The major vegetation is 
regenerating Manuka scrub extending into the native bush. The property was purchased 
as a lifestyle block (farming is not their primary income), but it winters 400 Isu. 
Table 8. Farm F AEM Input Assumptions. 
Operation Year Hours/ha/vr Costs nSfZS/hr) 
Pre-plant spray 0 2.0 20 
Plant 833 sph 1 4.7 20 
Release 1 2.0 20 
Prune 350 sph to 2.2m 2 7.0 20 
Prune 325 sph to 4.5 4 14.0 20 
Thin to 600 sph 4 5.3 25 
Prune 300 sph to 6.5 6 17.3 20 
Thin to 300 sph 7 7.2 25 
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Farm F; Costs Table 
Operation Start (vr^ Finish (vr) Cost (NZS/ha/vr") 
Establishment 1 1 166.00 
Fencing 1 1 111.57 
Management 1 28 127.00 
Farm F; Log aggregation yield table m^ 
Age PR A K S3L3 Pulp Total Waste 
28 212.8 148 104.8 62.4 110.8 638.9 8.6 
Farm F; Log Prices (NZ$) m^ 
Age m A S3L3 K Pujp 
28 $188 $119 $71 $95 $49 
Farm F: Harvesting Costs 
Operation Crop Type NZ$/ m^ 
Cartage $0.17 ni3/kmx 105km $18.00 
Administration/Sales $5.00 
Log and Load $4.00 
Roading $2.00 
Total $30.00 
A joint venture scenario was evaluated for the plantations on Farm F. This 
involved an AEM run for each planting (186ha). The division of the project costs and 
grazing revenues between the landowner and the investor are siraimarized in Table 9. 
Table 9. Farm F Joint Venture Revenues and Costs Distributions. 
Revenues Landowner % Investor % 
Understorey revenues before planting 100% 0% 
Understorey revenues after planting 100% 0% 
Costs Landowner% Investor% 
Silviculture costs 0% 100% 
Supervision of silviculture 0% 100% 
Incidental costs 0% 100% 
Establishment costs 0% 100% 
Re-establishment costs 0% 100% 
Fixed costs 100% 0% 
Land cost 100% 0% 
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RESULTS 
Cash flows 
AEM output sheets show the cash flows on the agroforestry project and the whole 
farm cash flows in 1997 dollars with no discoimting. For example, the cash flows on the 
agroforestry project reflects the revenue and expenditure on a per ha basis of the 
agroforestry project, not the whole farm. AEM output sheets show cash flows on the 
agroforestry projects as a marginal investment as well. (For this analysis, individvial 
planted areas on a single farm were evaluated as one project.) 
Table 10. Cumulative Cash Flows on All Farms. 
Farm A Farm B Farm C Farm D Farm E Farm F 
Farm Size/ ha 275 152 5891 840 250 243 
Project Size/ ha 314.1 112 2200 84 160 186 
Project Length/ yrs 100 32 35 33 35 30 
Forestry Project as a 
Marginal Investment 33133.84 55841.11 13189 6667.21 36046.81 40727.43 
W/O Forestry/ $NZ ha 3794.45 -3041.68 931.29 1109.22 3314.87 1582.45 
Cash Flows on 
Forestry Project/ $NZ ha 36845.38 59969.11 37232.8 6998.86 36749.19 41058.02 
W/O Forestry/ $NZ ha 8033.69 0 1646.92 1440.86 4017.25 1913.04 
Cash Flows on 
Total Farm/ $NZ ha 48195.06 45059.77 36338.71 12514.4 34679.9 40086.18 
W/O Forestry/ $NZ ha 20997.09 -4128 1313.02 6956.4 1947.96 941.23 
Net Present Value 
A change in land use will lead to a change in farm NPV. The NPV is sensitive to 
both the discoimt rate and the number of years that contribute to the valuation. Table 11 
shows the whole farms NPV for discount rates ranging from 6-10. The change in NPV 
(or the effect of the project) is a comparison between the farms NPV with and without 
forestry. While AEM outputs sheets present values with both contract and own labor, the 
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summary tables assume contract labor (as if someone was paid to do the work and 
supervision) is used. 
Table 11. NPV for Whole Farm Over a Range of Discount Rates. 
DR = Discount Rate; NPV = of total farm per project hectare 
EOP = Effect of the project on farm NPV contract labor per hectare 
FamiA Farm A FarmB FamB 
e NPVSNZ BOPSNZ NFV®C ECP$NZ 
6 -58.94 874.4 4543.44 6708.22 
8 -830.69 262.94 1255.35 4475.97 
10 -1136.7 5258 577.46 2555.31 
FarmC FarmC FarmD FamiD 
NFV EOP NPV ECP 
6 1101.52 109268 970.36 501.48 
8 189.25 284.8 459.24 85.44 
10 -27Z01 -107.81 175.31 -129.95 
FamiE FarmE FarmF FarmF 
NPV EOP NPV ECF 
6 5266.81 449267 5661.51 5297.58 
8 2459.31 1999.86 2476.27 2279.07 
10 878.5 633.22 296.18 626.88 
Table 12 shows the IRR and the NPV for the project with three different options. 
The figures include the costs of land and fixed costs at the start of the project. The cash 
flows used to derive the IRR are shown in Cumulative Cash Flows on All Farms (Table 
10). 
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Table 12. IRR and NPV for All Farms. 
Farm A Farm B Farm C Farm D Farm E Farm F 
Marginallnvestment 6.15% 9.94% 10.23% 16.25% 14.4% 13.04% 
IRR Own Labor 
Marginallnvestment 5.91% 9.24% 8.66% 12.00% 11.95% 11.32% 
IRR Contract Labor 
Marginallnvestment 2.43% 0% 6.14% 20.00% 13.64% 11.92% 
IRR No forestry 
Cash Flows 
Whole farm cash flow in five year increments for the three farm sites with joint 
ventures is provided in Table 13. The cash flows were evaluated for the agroforestry 
projects assuming the farmer provides the financing. If an investor covers the 
establishment and silviculture costs, the cash flows would be different, generally more 
stable over time and subject only to the variable cash flows of a traditional working farm 
without forestry. 
Table 13. Cash Flows for Whole Farm with Farmer Financing Forestry Project. 
Farm D Farm E Farm F 
Year ($NZ)/ha ($NZ)/ha ($NZ)/ha 
1-5 855.13 -645.87 -1050.02 
6-10 774.13 -565.37 -1149.19 
11-15 955.36 -416.9 -539.61 
16-20 893.95 -226.41 -641.64 
21-25 882.33 -294.01 -648.02 
26-30 3667.5 25149.02 44114.69 
31-35 4486 11679.44 n/a 
Cumulative 12514.4 34679.9 40086.21 
Forestry profitability is determined by the wood values at the harvest and the real 
opportunity cost of the cash capital to the landowner and investors. For a landowner, the 
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opportunity cost can be defined as the forgone grazing revenue. For an investor, the 
opportvinity costs is simply the value of any forgone investment opportunity. While the 
opportunity costs to an investor cannot generally be quantified, the forgone grazing 
revenue, substantially affects the cash flows on the whole farm. Assuming logging sales 
revenues remain constant, the forgone grazing revenue is the primary opportunity cost for 
the landowner to consider. The effect of the forgone grazing revenue is linked to the 
proportion of the farm included in the forestry project and the total area as well the 
stocking rates per hectare. Profitability of forestry and cash flows on the whole farm are 
shown in Table 14. 
Table 14. Logging Sales, Grazing Revenue Forgone and Cash Flows for farms A-F. 
Total Cumulative Total Cumulative Total Cumulative Cash Flows 
Project Project Grazing Revenue Logging Sales Cash Flow Forestry Project 
Farm Site Length/ yrs Size/ ha Forgone $NZ/ha Revenue $NZ/ha Fwestry Project $NZ/ha $NZ/ Project ha 
Farm A 100 314.1 5315.65 41156.15 42084.12 36845.38 
FarmB 32 112 0 60876.94 41473.27 56285.15 
FarmC 35 2200 11582 26761.87 13904.63 37232.8 
FarmD 33 84 1098 8174.17 6998.86 69988.55 
FarmE 35 160 2669 49557.76 36749.19 57420.6 
FarmF 30 186 1420 59270.47 41058.02 53640.32 
* Total cumulative revenues are divided by becatares comprising total &rm, not hectares comprising project. 
The timing of the cash flow fluctuations is critical to farmers' ability to sustain 
their farm. The total farm cash flows reflect the variability in the forgone grazing 
revenues. Table 15 shows this trend. 
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Table 15. Farm D and Farm F Grazing Revenue 
Foi^one and Whole Farm Cash Flow. 
Farm D Grazing Total Farm Farm F Grazing Total Farm 
Revalue Fwgone Cash Flow Revenue Fra-gwie Cash Flow 
Year perfermha/$NZ perha/$NZ po-fermha/SNZ perha/$NZ 
1-5 166.01 855.13 212.56 -1050.02 
6-10 1102 774.13 110.53 -1149.19 
11-15 154.87 955.36 210.43 -539.61 
16-20 220.77 893.95 312.46 -641.64 
21-25 232.4 882.33 318.84 -648.02 
Joint Venture Cost and Revenue Distributions 
In a forestry joint venture, both parties have entered into a long term agreement 
accepting, but not specifically determining, the risks and returns of establishing a forest. 
As a result, the landowner allows the investor to put capital to work on the landowner's 
land. Each party derives a share of the returns that represents the worth of each of 
partner's input. The revenue fi-om a Forestry Right should represent the earnings rate of 
the project, the relative inputs by landowner and investors, and if the landowner prefers to 
take annual rent rather than participate in the risk of the growing phase taken by the 
investor. For the purposes of this study, the project land costs (the recognized value as a 
purchase price not the income forgone by not grazing) and the fixed costs (defined as the 
costs which remain the same, regardless of whether the land is used for farming or 
agroforestry) have been attributed to the land owner. The investor pays the material, 
silviculture, and extra incidental costs associated with the trees. The revenues are 
distributed at the time of harvest and are apportioned based on the percent of the cost 
inputs. The actual land value (as a percentage of the projects total direct costs) are 
shown for each joint venture in Table 16. 
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Table 16. Land Value as a Percent of the Total Project Costs. All values $NZ. 
Farm Site Farm D Farm D Farm E Farm E Farm E FarmF 
Project Size 37 ha 57 ha 110 ha '97 25 ha '94 25 ha 186 ha 
Land Value $643 ha $643 ha $1235 ha $1235 ha $1235 ha $650ha 
T1 Direct 
Costs/ha $3320 $3320 $2575 $3667 $3869 $5273 
Land Value 
as % of TDC 19.4% 19.4% 47.9% 33.7% 31.9% 12.3% 
*Total direct costs include labor costs (silviculture x hourly rate); contract supervision; 
other costs (fixed, variable and incidental); plant materials and establishments as well as 
the re-establishment column. 
The shared forestry revenues have been adjusted to reflect the grazing revenue the 
farm receives fi"om the livestock grazing imder the trees. Based on the landowner 
covering 100% of the land costs and 100% of the fixed costs, Table 17 shows the non 
discounted forestry shared costs and revenue distributions. Per hectare costs and 
revenues are based on the project hectares not the total farm hectares. 
Table 17. Non Discounted Forestry Costs and Revenues Distribution for Farms D-F. 
Land Value Costs/ha Costs/ha Revenues/ha Revenues/ha 
% of TDC Landowner Investor Landowner Investor 
Farm $NZ/% $NZ/% $NZ/% $NZ/% 
Farm D 57 ha 19.4 4321.81/51.4 3320.38/48.6 31,112.30/49.2 32140.23/50.8 
Farm D 37 ha 19.4 4321.81/51.4 3320.38/48.6 31112.3 /49.2 32140.23/50.8 
Farm E 1991 47.9 2144.33/45.4 2575.96/54.6 24895.13/43.3 32627.47/56.7 
Farm E 1994 31.9 2269.76/37 3869.08/63 19388.36/33.7 38134.24/66.3 
Farm E 1997 33.7 2175.68/37.2 3667.48/62.8 19884/34.6 37638.64/65.4 
Farm F 12.3 1081.90/17 5273.95/83 8844.85/15.2 49425.15/84.8 
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Table 18. Discounted Forestry Cost and Revenue Distribution for Farms D-F. 
Land Value Costs/ha Costs/ha Revenues/ha Revenues/ha 
Farm and % of TDC Landowner Investor Landowner Investor 
Discount Rate $NZ/% $NZ/% $NZ/% $NZ/% 
Farm D37 &57 19.4 
6 2037.88/45.7 2417.14/54.3 4488.44/38.5 7185.25/61.6 
8 1805.35/44.9 2209.25/55.0 2314.00/34.1 4474.74/65.9 
10 1634.33/44.6 2032.00/55.4 1131.61/28.4 2855.79/71.6 
Farm E 1991 47.9 
6 1686.72/48.7 1777.14/51.3 5102.45/45.3 6150.71/54.7 
8 1612.87/49.7 1630.96/50.3 3041.84/45.6 3625.82/54.4 
10 1558.17/50.7 1515.28/49.3 1817.65/45.6 2171.15/54.4 
Farm E 1994 31.9 
6 1703.12/38.2 2751.36/61.8 3638.88/34.2 6995.36/65.8 
8 1622.24/39.0 2511.76/60.8 2027.76/34.0 3929.56/66.0 
10 1563.56/40.3 2311.96/59.7 1127.76/33.4 2245.24/66.6 
Farm E 1997 33.7 
6 1692.52/39.0 2649.04/61.0 3926.4/34.9 7326.76/65.1 
8 1616.24/40.0 2425.84/60.0 2334.56/35.0 4333.08/65.0 
10 1560.16/41.1 2238.24/58.9 1391.76/34.9 2597.04/65.0 
Farm F 12.3 
6 860.06/22.2 3018.35/77.8 1979.49/18.4 8774.63/81.6 
8 825.04/23.4 2618.019/76.0 1175.83/18.8 5078.14/81.2 
10 799.29/25.72 2308.01/74.3 678.55/18.5 2994.76/81.5 
When evaluating the profitability of a joint venture, the choice of an appropriate 
discount rate is a critical decision. There is an inverse relationship between the discount 
rate and the costs and revenues distribution. First, as the discoxmt rate increases the dollar 
value of costs and revenues decreases, the NPV decreases, and the distribution of costs 
and revenues between the landowner and investor shifts. Table 19 uses the figures fi-om 
Farm D to illustrate the discount rates relationship to costs and revenues. 
Table 19. Relationship Between Discount Rate and NPV. 
Discount Rate Investor costs $NZ/ha Investor revenues $NZ/ha NPV ($NZ) 
0 3320.38 32140.22 28819.84 
4 2663.57 11739.51 9075.94 
6 2417.14 7185.24 4768.1 
8 2209.25 4474.73 2265.48 
10 2032 2855.78 823.78 
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The NPV is linked to the percent distributed to the landowner and the investor and 
therefore both variables cannot be separated from each other. Subsequently the projects 
can be designed to reflect the needs and resources of each party. If the land value and 
fixed costs are used to determine the landowner distributions, when the discount rate 
changes so do the relative distributions and consequently the NPVs. On the other hand, if 
the distributions are fixed by a standard percent, the discount rate only affects the NPV. 
Each of the joint ventures was evaluated based on a forestry cost and forestry revenue 
distribution between landowner and investor of20/80, 30/70, 40/60 and 50/50. The 
discounted proposed distributions are outlined in Figures 1-5. 
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Fig. 1 Farm D 37 ha and 57 ha Joint Venture NPV per forestry project hectare over a 
range of cost and revenue distributions to the landowner and investor at discount rates of 
6,8, and 10%. 
38 
Farm E '91 JV Investor Share Costs and Revenues 
> 
Ph 
12; 
8000 
6000 
4000 
2000 
0 
80 70 60 
Investor Share (%) 
50 
-•-8 
-A—10 
Farm E '91 JV Landowner Share Costs and Revenues 
1000 -
20 30 40 
Landowner Share (%) 
50 
• 6  
• 8  
•10 
Fig. 2. Farm E Joint Venture 1991 NPV per forestry project hectare over a range of cost 
and revenue distributions to the landowner and investor at discount rates of 6,8, and 10%. 
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Fig. 3. Farm E Joint Venture 1997 NPV per forestry project hectare over a range of cost 
and revenues distributions to the landowner and investor at discount rates of 6,8, and 
10%. 
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Fig. 4. Farm E Joint Venture 1994 NPV per forestry project hectare over a range of cost 
and revenues distributions to the landowner and investor at discount rates of 6,8, and 
10%. 
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Fig. 5. Farm F Joint Venture 1994 NPV per forestry project hectare over a range of cost 
and revenue distributions to the landowner and investor at discount rates of 6,8 and 10%. 
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Table 20. Agroforestry Joint Venture Project. Estimated Internal Rates of Return 
Assuming Landowner covers 100% Fixed Costs and 100% Land Value. 
Estimated IRR Estimated IRR 
Investor Landowner 
Farm D (37 ha) 12.6 10.4 
Farm D (57 ha) 12.6 10.4 
Farm E (110 ha) 11.8 11.2 
Farm E ('94 25 ha) 9.9 9.2 
Farm E ('97 25 ha) 10.8 12.5 
FarmF 11-4 9.0 
DISCUSSION 
Limitations of Decision Support Model 
While AEM provides a good benchmark for evaluating forestry investments, there 
are weaknesses to evaluating forestry investments with decision support models. First, 
AEM deals v^dth quantitative averages without a qualitative inventory. Second, while 
there can be a complementary relationship between farming and forestry, good farm land 
usually makes good forest land. Therefore, farmers who plant trees in a high cost, low 
return farm areas report that their livestock numbers are not reduced despite what may be 
calculated displacement (by trees) using models such as AEM (Perley, 1992). Third, 
effective profitability varies widely with each microsite. There are differences with 
efBciencies in individual paddocks not accounted for in AEM. AEM does not allow 
inputting how different land uses perform within the farm, and how they can be planned to 
complement each other. Fourth, decision-making relates to economics on a farm-level not 
a stand-level and variability is considerable over time. Stand -level finances cannot be 
detached fi-om the economics of the whole farm and the farmers overall objectives, 
management strategies and whole farm constraints (Perley, 1997). While AEM will 
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produce a range of answers depending on the variables applied to the cash flow analysis, it 
does not adequately account for resources (ie reducing weed costs, reducing capital 
depreciation associated with soil erosion, providing a riparian buffer for runoflF, or 
happiness and satisfaction of the families) not included in the ferm accounts (Perley, 
1997). In conclusion, ferm management may be more art than science and the best 
decisions may not be made with spreadsheets and financial numbers. While, this study 
applies quantitative data, it is imperative to recognize that the financial rationale is not 
limited to a quantitative decision support model that generates impressive numbers. The 
best decisions combine scientific data with artistic intuition, mindfiil reflection, and 
qualitative evolution. 
Effects on Cash Flows 
The results suggest that introducing trees into a pure grazing farming system has 
two major effects on farmers' cash flows. First, the reduced livestock rates over time 
result in a short term loss of farm income. Second, forestry costs are incurred in the short-
term with a significant amount of income being received at the end of the rotation. 
Therefore, while the long term benefits of planting trees have the potential to exceed a 
traditional farming system, the farmer needs enough cash to remain solvent during the 
period of lost grazing revenue to the forestry revenue. Consequently, the real cost to the 
farmer of establishing forestry on developed grazing land is the opportunity costs of the 
lost grazing revenue which occurs after establishing trees. The farm overhead costs will 
remain similar (Jarvis et al, 1989). In addition, the main determinants of forestry 
profitability are the wood values at the harvest period and the real opportunity costs of the 
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cash capital to the investors. Each of these factors incorporates risk and certainty. The 
feasibility of an agroforestry project can be ascertained by closely examining and assessing 
the net cash flow. While assumptions can be made and trends analyzed, the certainty of 
projected cash flow is limited in AEM because of these models assumptions. 
An agroforestry venture needs to be evaluated as a freestanding venture as well as 
being integrated into the profitability of the whole farm. For the purpose of this study, 
analysis assumed all silvicultural operations were done by contract labor. All of the farms 
showed an increase in cumulative cash flow when trees were planted. The cash flows on 
the forestry investment were between 4 and 22 times greater than the cash flows without 
forestry. However, while the landowner will increase their cumulative cash flow for the 
whole farm if they fimd the forestry investment alone, the IRR is not as high as farming 
alone. Moreover, the year by year analysis each alternative illustrates the project effect 
on the cash flows for the farm. The timing of the cash flows are just as important as the 
net cash flows and for many landowner determine their land use. While wool and meat 
prices may fluctuate over time and be a high risk in the short term, waiting for large 
returns over a 28 year forestry rotation is not an option for many farmers. As an 
alternative, an investor will reduce the cumulative returns from forestry to the landowner, 
but they will cover the costs that may make the project impossible for a landowner to do 
on their own. 
The IRR is defined as the discoimt rate where the discounted costs and revenues 
equal 0. It is also the interest rate in real terms that the user would expect to obtain from 
the investment. Therefore, the real return is the discount rate at which an investor would 
be indifferent to the choice between continuation of the grazing regime and agroforestry 
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since the agroforestry regime would earn (at this discount rate) no more and no less than 
the expected returns for continuing a farming system under pure grazing. 
AEM calculates the non discoimted NPV and IRR without separating the project 
area from the whole area at any time during the life of the project. However, the 
profitability of the various agroforestry options was compared with and without ferming in 
terms of IRR and NPV. Because the fixed costs are constant and applicable to all options, 
the figures are expressed as marginal costs and revenues. The IRR on the marginal 
investment returns using contract labor for forestry exceeded the IRR without forestry for 
Farms A and C (Table 12). The IRR decreased slightly for Farms E and F. Farm D 
showed the most dramatic results with the IRR decreasing by 8.0% when trees were 
planted. The results suggest that planting trees affected the IRR most dramatically when 
less than 50% of land was converted and significant grazing continues on the unplanted 
area. When less than 5% of the land is converted the costs of forestry outweigh the 
revenues and IRR decreased as a result. This indicates the landowner should probably not 
convert any hectares to forestry unless an investor is financing the project. The IRR was 
largely imaflfected when the total converted land exceeded 50% and minimal grazing 
occured on the unplanted areas. When the rates of return are quite close, the landowner 
should assess the risk and certainty of each investment. If they are financing the project 
themselves, the landowner should choose the alternative with the least risk over a 
specified period of time. 
Overall, because the planting and felling occurs in a few sizeable blocks, the cash 
flow is feirly constant except for periods with heavy costs of establishment (ejq^ressed as 
forgone livstock revenue), silviculture, or revenues from harvest. If the landowner is 
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fimding the forestry venture, capital would be invested as the farm accounts needed it over 
the length of the project. The investor would invest when the project demands required 
it. As a result, the minimum and maximum cash flows will be moderate reflecting the 
forgone grazing revenue and the silvilculture labor costs. 
If planting is staggered in small increments over many years the cash flow will 
become constant. For example. Farm A has achieved a state where plantings and harvests 
reached a constant level. Consequently, after 38 years, the cash flows are constant. An 
outside investor will have the same effect in a shorter period of time. Because the outside 
investor is paying for the establishment and silvicultiiral costs, the minimum and maximum 
cash flows are balanced and focused around the initial loss of livestock and revenue and 
harvesting profits. Farms B and C will have the same patterns, but because they are 
investment properties rather than family income properties the sensitivities are important 
only for understanding the cash flow. Table 4 shows the forestry effects on the cash flow 
for the whole farm without a joint venture. Farm E and Farm F have planted 64% and 
76% of their farms in trees. With the exception of minimal imderstory grazing they have 
converted the annual cash flows generating land and are more sensitive to the forgone 
grazing revenue. In contrast. Farm D has only converted one percent of the total land and 
while his cash flows fluctuate he has enough grazing revenue to carry the forestry 
investments. While Table 40 illustrates the cash flows over time. Table 13 shows the 
direct relationship between forgone grazing revenues and cash flows. Even if an investor 
covers the cost of the silviculture, the landowner will still be affected by the forgone 
grazing revenue on the planted areas. 
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An investment partner decreases the risks and reduces the variability cash flows 
over time. Consequently, from a farmers point of view, the ideal partnership in 
agroforestry investment would involve the fermer being compensated for the net farming 
revenue lost as a result of introducing trees and receive a portion of the forestry revenue 
before harvest. The sheep and beef farming industry in New Zealand is characterized by 
many farmers in financial difBculties (MAF, 1997). They may not be in debt or threat of 
foreclosure but they are certainly making choices to reduce expenditures. Although they 
may be interested in diversifying their income, relatively few farmers have the ability to 
sustaki the reductions in income that come from displacing their livestock with trees. 
While some farmers can sustain this displacement, a joint venture investment partner is the 
solution for others. A traditional joint venture arrangement involves the distribution of 
profit at the end of the rotation based on inputs over the life of the trees. Because a 
formers overhead costs remain largely unchanged, this traditional distribution does not 
address the short term revenue loss. 
An alternative to traditional joint ventures is the landowner receiving a lump simi 
payment. The former would accept a discounted risk free amount now based on likely 
forecasted revenue losses. (MoF, 1989). Another alternative would involve compensating 
the landowner for the forgone grazing revenue with an annual annuity. Over the life of the 
investment, the farmer would receive an annual payment based on the present value of the 
lump sum. These methods could be used for farmers who are short of working capital and 
make joint ventures more accessible. 
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Joint Venture Analysis 
The underlying question regarding planting trees and joint ventures in particular is 
what proportion of the final net revenues fi-om the sales of the trees would be required to 
compensate an investor who met the early costs of silviculture, grazing forgone, or both? 
All of the values indicate that the chosen discount rate and the regime/site particulars 
radically affect where the threshold falls. 
The value of the project land and the fixed costs or a portion of the fixed costs 
usually determine the landowner and investor costs and revenue distributions. The 
contribution of the land value to the total direct costs determines the allocations. It is 
important to note that total revenues are made up of forestry revenues and, if applicable, 
the revenues fi-om grazing under the trees. For example, if the landowner pays for the 
entire land cost, which is 32% of the total costs and receives all of the project grazing 
revenues, then the landowner's share of the forestry revenues is adjusted to take into 
account the received grazing income. Consequently, the values in Table 17 reflect these 
adjustments. Although the specific results vary, table 17 indicates the landowner share of 
the harvest revenue is dependent on the value of the land used for the project. 
Table 18 illustrates the range of revenue and cost distributions over time. The 
discount rate affects not only the dollar value of the investment, but the NPV of the 
project to each party and the revenue distributions to the landowner and the investor. To 
assess the threshold for investor compensation, the discount rates effect on the project 
must be examined. Because of the discovint rates affect on the NPV, the value of a 
sequence of annual flows is less when you require a high rate of return on your investment 
than when you require a low rate. To ascertain the threshold value, you want the value of 
49 
the future cash flow payments to be equal or exceed your initial investment. The amount 
of excess or profit depends on the discount rate. 
While the discoimt rate affects the NPV, it also affects the distribution of costs and 
revenues. Specifically, the final revenues wiU receive a higher weighting at low discoimt 
rates and the initial costs will receive a higher weighting at high discount rates. As a 
result, when the forestry cost and revenue distributions are allocated according to the 
landowner covering 100% of the land and fixed costs, the discount rate affects the relative 
forestry cost and revenue distributions between landowner and investor. For each 
discount rate, the results of the decision making variables change 
Specifically, in all of the case studies except for Farm D, a higher discoimt rate will 
increase the forestry revenue distributed to the landowner and decrease the forestry 
revenue to the investor by the same proportion (Table 18). Regardiag forestry costs, a 
higher discount rate will increase the costs distributed to the landowner and decrease the 
costs distributed to the investor proportionally. The range of distribution allocations over 
the range of discount rates depend on the grazing revenues and the labor and costs tables 
for each project. 
In contrast, in both joint venture projects on Farm D the relationships between 
discount rates and distributions are inverted. A higher discount rate will decrease the 
forestry revenue distributed to the landowner and increase the forestry revenue distributed 
to the investor by the same amount. With a non-discounted distribution and the 
landowner covering 100% of the land and fixed costs, the range of forestry revenue 
distributed to the landowner and investor between a zero discount rate and a discount rate 
of 10 is 20.81%. A higher discount rate will decrease the forestry costs distributed to the 
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landowner and increase the costs distributed to the investor proportionally. The 
difference between a non-discounted allocation of forestry costs and a discount rate of 
10% is 6.82 percentage points. This is because at the higher discount rate the initial 
costs receive more weight and the initial costs redistribute the costs and revenues 
proportionally. 
When assessing the NPV over the fixed percentage distributions to the landowner 
and investor of 20/80, 30/70, 40/60 and 50/50, the numbers suggest that over a range of 
discount rates the greatest NPV is not the same for the landowner and the investor. At 
the same discoimt rate over a range of distributions, the landowner has the highest NPV 
with approximately a 50% contribution of the costs yielding 50% of the revenue. The 
NPV for the investor is greatest with an 80% contribution of the costs yielding 80% of the 
revenue. Nevertheless, the actual project designs do not yield constant distributions 
regardless of the discount rate. Because the distributions of costs and revenues vary with 
the discount rate, each of the joint ventures illustrates actual scenarios that fall somewhere 
in between the ideal scenarios for the landowner and the investor. Consequently, in each 
joint venture one party is favored over the other. To maximize returns, the landowner and 
the investor would want to choose the point where the discount rate is close to the IRR. 
The distributions as well as the NPVs at each discoimt rate vary widely across all of the 
joint ventures. 
Discussion of IRR 
While it is difiBcult to ascertain the individual investors costs of capital, the IRR 
"decision rule" Droms (1998) states that any project with an IRR greater than or equal to 
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the investors cost of capital shoixld be accepted. This study assiuned that each paddock 
was equally productive and did not evaluate the marginal returns on the grazing in the 
paddock[s] proposed for forestry. Therefore while the IRR is a useful tool, the NPV is 
the figiire used to evaliaate the quantifiable returns on the investment to both parties. 
Because the percentage of the costs and revenues covered by the landowner and investor 
vary based on the fixed and land costs of the landowner, the IRR and the NPVs are 
different for each party. However, when one assumes that the costs and revenue 
distributions are fixed and proportional at 20/80, 30/70. 40/60 and 50/50 
landowner/investor costs and revenue distributions, the IRR remains constant while the 
NPVs are different for each party and each allocation. The values are shown in figures 1 
through 5. 
While the land and fixed costs determine one set of distributions these may not 
yield the highest NPVs for both the landowner and the investor. All farms indicate that 
the greater percentage of costs incurred by each party the greater the NPV of their 
investment. However, if the landowner only contributes the fixed overhead and the land 
value, the forestry investment may not be the highest. Similarly, if the investor only 
contributes the difference between the landowner's contribution to costs and the total 
direct costs, the investor return may not be maximized. Some arrangements favor the 
investor while others fevor the landowner. Additionally, the thresholds that maximize the 
benefits to one or both parties are dependent on the discoimt rate each party chooses. 
For the farmer, the economic decision to plant trees is about cash flow, internal 
rates of return, timing, and risk. The research indicates that cost and revenue 
distributions to the farm based on fixed costs and land value do not necessarily maximize 
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the landowner's investment potential of a joint venture. However, if a landowner has a 
surplus of land and can afford the forgone grazing revenue on less productive paddocks, 
the effect of the agroforestry project on the NPV of the whole farm indicates that a joint 
venture is a profitable idea. The joint venture allows the landowner to diversify income 
without the outlay of cash capital beyond the overhead. Regardless of the alternate land 
use, the landowner will enjoy the benefits of an increase in cash flows at the time of 
harvest. 
The investor needs to decide if the forgone revenue fi-om the farmer's contribution 
of land value and fixed costs outweighs the NPV of directly purchasing the land. For 
example. Farm B and Farm C are both 100% investor-owned properties. These 
partnership NPVs indicate that purchasing the land outright has been a good investment 
during a period when real land values have been increased. Not only do they have the 
trees, but they also have the value of the land itself However, depending on their 
objectives, a joint venture saves them the cash capital investment of purchasing the land 
and provides them a reasonable return. While it is not quantifiable, a joint venture does 
require a considerable amount of emotional energy and sensitivity from both parties. If an 
investor is not prepared to meet the landowner's objectives and address their needs then 
perhaps the partnership or 100% fimded property is a better idea. 
Critique of Management Regimes 
Although the results reflect the outcome from a variety of inputs for each ferm, 
there are several other variables that could be altered to substantially change the returns. 
For example, each farm has a reasonably intensive silviculture management system applied 
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to the forestry projects. To reduce the costs of the silviculture labor, one could plant 
fewer stems per hectare, manage the trees with non- pruning regime, or forgo thinning. 
Genetic improvement can play a role in the total recoverable yield of merchantable timber. 
While the measurable affects of genetic improvement are variable, estimates of potential 
yield increases are greater than 20%. (Jarvis, 1989) Therefore, genetic improvement may 
allow lower initial stockings and a series of cost savings in establishment and tending. In 
addition to the direct gains in growth and form with a final crop, genetic improvement can 
enhance returns fi-om pruning. Finally, improvement to disease resistance will reduce 
protection costs, enhance greater wood production, and reduce investment risk. 
Non market benefits 
In addition to the economic benefit of trees on pastures, there are less quantifiable 
benefits that can influence overall farm productivity and health. For example, trees 
provide shelter and shade for the livestock. This enhanced microclimate can contribute 
to reducing overall stock stress. Second, the shelter and shade can reduce the risks of 
mortality in lambs and sheared sheep by sheltering temperature-vulnerable stock. Third, 
the influence of shelter and shade can have an affect on pastoral productivity. For 
example, the pastvire productivity of stony shallow soils is positively affected by shelter 
which reduces evapotranspiration rates. Radcliffe (1985) recorded a 60% improvement 
in dryland pastoral production due to shelter on a Canterbury ferm with low water holding 
capacity (Jarvis et al, 1989). Fourth, in the social surveys measuring why farmers plant 
trees the results suggested that aesthetics are highly valued by farmers. While it has not 
been quantifiably proven, the enhanced working environment may have a positive effect on 
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overall farm labor productivity. Fifth, income diversity enhances security. A farm that 
has variety of tradeable commodities has more flexibility and therefore increased financial 
security. Finally, a farm with added aesthetic amenities and diversified income potential 
may be more marketable, providing an increase in both price and speed of sale. 
The owner fimded farm forestry venture demonstrates that if a landowner has the 
cash capital to invest in forestry he will financially and environmentally benefit fi-om the 
diversification. Farm A is an illustration of a successful agroforestry project. While it was 
initially accepted by the immediate community with reluctance, their environmental 
stewardship ethic has become a model for many landowners in the Bay of Plenty. Farm B 
emerged as the direct result of individuals who concluded that they could have more 
control and greater financial return if they purchased land and hired a manager. The 
partnership arrangement allows a smaller financial commitment and greater flexibility. 
Farm C is an exemplary model of investor-owned multiple use. The owners are 
implementing land class suitability principles and the diversity and sensitivity to the 
existing fi-amework and contours of the land provide a model for others. Farms D, E and 
F aU illustrate that joint ventures can be profitable for both the landowner and investment, 
but the financial returns are largely dependent on the input variables and the distributions. 
Conclusion 
While the most recent survey of farmers' attitudes was collected in 1995, 
additional studies need to be conducted to evaluate current attitudes if a large-scale joint 
venture program is to be implemented. Furthermore, in spite of the quantifiable and 
qualifiable data illustrating what parameters if any drive land conversion and what planting 
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regimes will maximize forestry investments for the landowner and the investor; the time 
spent with landowners over tea and driving in their truck indicated that the decision to 
plant trees is largely a personal one. The most successfiil forestry investments are created 
with a landowner who loves trees. 
This study attempts to answer some preliminary questions about small scale 
forestry investments, but it uncovers some additional areas that need to be addressed. 
Illustrated by the sociological studies, (Morey, 1986) the perception of the landowners 
does not represent a group who plants trees for economic reasons. Consequently, some 
land management plans with specific objectives need to be developed and marketed to 
farmers. Second, while many groups and individuals are working to better understand the 
environmental and economic advantages of planting trees on pasture lands, there seems to 
be a need for a non-biased informational exchange agency to bridge the gap between 
forestry and agriculture industries. Third, there is no national database available in New 
Zealand for inventorying registered forestry rights agreements. There may be a need to 
facilitate dialogue and the exchange of information among those landowners who have or 
are interested in diversifying their agricultural land with trees. 
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Appendix 1 Growth Model Details 
Model number 9 NAPIRAD 
The model is available 
This model can grow backwards 
Genetic Gain is allowed. 
Description NAPIRAD P.RAD 1983 M. Lawrence 
Database 207 plots (few imthinned) 
Submodels 
Default height model: Type H Number 26 
model data ranges 
warmngs error 
mm max min max 
Basal Area 0.6 90.3 0.0 200.0 
Height 3.6 47.0 0.0 99.9 
Stocking 99 2772 1 10000 
Site Index 20.6 38.5 1.0 99.9 
Age 4-1 29.2 0.0 99.9 
Model number 22 PPM88 
The model is available 
This model can grow backwards 
Genetic Gain is allowed. 
Description PPM** P.Rad RO Pxraiice Plateau 1988 
Database 297 plots (2295 meas.) from Kaingaroa, Tarawera. 
Submodels 
Default height model: Type H Number 34 
model data ranges 
wammgs error 
min max min max 
Basal Area 0.5 79.3 0.0 200.0 
Height 2.6 51.0 0.0 99.9 
Stocking 89 5239 1.0 10000 
Site Index 22.5 39.4 1.0 99.9 
Age 2.8 38.0 0.0 99.9 
